IGA alone is enough when
Access to sensitive data is granted only through application roles, and your role definitions already say which data each role can reach.
Category comparison. Access governance.
What each one governs, what it reads and what a reviewer signs off, traced through one leaver and one service account.
By Dipal Panchal, co-founder and CEO · Updated November 8, 2026
Identity governance and administration (IGA) manages identities and their access across the organization: who joins, moves and leaves, and which accounts, roles and entitlements each one holds. Data access governance knows who can reach sensitive data and decides whether they should, with a record of each decision.
Keep manager reviews of roles in your IGA program, and add owner reviews of who can reach each sensitive store. An IGA review asks a manager whether a person still needs a role. A data access review asks a data owner whether this access to this data is still right.
Explore data access governanceCells describe the typical IGA or access governance tool, and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) row is our reading.
| Aspect | Identity governance (IGA) | Data access governance |
|---|---|---|
| Acts on | The identity: a person or service, and the accounts it holds | The data: a sensitive table, bucket, folder or file |
| Question it answers | Does each person have the right accounts and roles for their job? | Who can reach this sensitive data, and should they? |
| Main strength | Joiner, mover and leaver processes and role-based requests at scale | Seeing the rights inside each data store, including grants made outside any workflow |
| What it cannot do | See rights inside databases and file shares, below the application role | Explain why a person was given access, or run the joiner, mover and leaver process |
| Best fit | Organizations that grant access through application roles | Teams that must show who could reach specific sensitive data |
| A typical scenario | A manager certifies that an analyst still needs a reporting role | A data owner removes a direct grant on a claims table |
| Where it runs | Connects to directories, HR systems and applications | A scanner that reads permissions in each data store with an account you grant |
| What it reads | Identity directories, HR records and application entitlements, often at role or group level | Permissions inside each data store: grants, roles, groups, sharing links and inherited rights |
| Service accounts | Not managed through joiner, mover and leaver events, so they need a process of their own | Treated like any other identity: which data the account can reach, and who owns it |
| Closest NIST CSF 2.0 outcome | PR.AA-01 identities and credentials, and PR.AA-05 access permissions | PR.AA-05 access permissions and least privilege, applied to the data itself |
Suppose an analyst left on October 31 and a reporting service account has run for years. Both can reach a claims database.
| Case | IGA sees | Data access governance sees |
|---|---|---|
| The leaver’s role | The HR feed ends the person; directory account and application roles are removed | The same, read from the data side: no role-based access remains |
| A direct grant the leaver held | Nothing, because the grant was made in the database outside any workflow | A login still holding read on the claims table, with the scan date |
| The service account | Listed only if someone onboarded it with an owner | Listed with the sensitive tables it can reach, for the data owner to keep, downgrade or remove |
| The decision | A manager certifies or revokes a role | The data owner records keep, revoke, downgrade or time-limit, with a reason |
| What the auditor retests | Who held which role and who certified it | Who could reach the data on a scan date, and the owner’s decision for each identity |
Access to sensitive data is granted only through application roles, and your role definitions already say which data each role can reach.
You have no IGA program yet, and the question in front of you is who can reach a handful of sensitive databases or shared drives.
IGA manages who joins, moves and leaves. Data access governance checks what that access reaches inside each store, including grants made outside IGA.
Create the leaver case on purpose, then ask each tool to find it.
IRIS links users, service accounts, roles and groups to sensitive data they can reach.
IRIS reads permissions where the source exposes permission data, and links users, service accounts, roles and groups to sensitive data.
IRIS flags broad rights on sensitive data, and stale access past the 90-day default or a period you set, where the source records activity. PostgreSQL tracks it per account unless audit logging is on.
For each grant, the reviewer picks keep, revoke, downgrade or time-limit, and writes the reason. Another person signs off every follow-up task.
Review decisions are kept in the audit history with their reasons, and every scan is dated.
Capabilities vary by edition.
A plain definition: who can reach sensitive data, whether they should, and the record that proves it.
How a reviewer confirms or removes access, and what gets recorded each time.
Review who can reach sensitive data, with each reviewer’s decision and its reason on the record.
No, not as a rule, though they overlap. IGA governs accounts and roles across applications, and some IGA programs reach into data stores. Data access governance starts from the rights inside each store, where sensitive data sits.
With the data owner. Keep manager reviews of roles in your IGA program, and add owner reviews of who can reach each sensitive store.
Someone must, by name. Record the owner when the account is created, and ask the data owner to confirm which sensitive data it should reach.
Campaigns and removal. Today reviews run per scope, with the decision and reason kept in the audit history; scheduled campaigns and reminders aren’t in v1. IRIS does not remove access: your team makes the change in the source system, and a re-scan confirms it.
Create the leaver test on one database this week, then book a demo to see the same review in IRIS.