Did anything keep the security code?
PCI DSS v4.0.1 Requirement 3.3.1 bars keeping sensitive authentication data after authorization, even if it isn’t readable, and the assessor looks in logs and history files too.
E-commerce. Retail. Customer data.
Order notes and refund exports can copy customer data out of the checkout. IRIS finds it in the stores you connect, with the roles that can read it.
Four paid engagements and three proofs of concept.
PCI DSS v4.0.1 Requirement 3.3.1 bars keeping sensitive authentication data after authorization, even if it isn’t readable, and the assessor looks in logs and history files too.
California’s right to delete, Civil Code §1798.105, covers the personal information you collected from the shopper, in your records and your service providers’, with listed exceptions.
Under §1798.140(ae), a card number together with its security code is sensitive personal information, so an order note holding both is more than contact data.
Records for an online shop’s stores, with one candidate the reviewer rejected and one store the scan couldn’t reach.
| Source | Location | Detected type | Why | Sensitivity | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Orders database | shop.orders.delivery_notes | Payment card number | Shoppers typed full card numbers into the free-text delivery notes | Restricted | Remove the values, then re-scan; the web team adds a check on that form field |
| Orders database | shop.customers.phone | Phone number | The delivery contact on each order | Confidential | Keep; limit reads to fulfillment and support roles |
| Support exports (SharePoint) | CustomerCare/Exports/refunds_2026_10.csv | Email address | A refund list exported for the month-end reconciliation | Confidential | Delete after the close, and record the date |
| Marketing warehouse | marketing.campaign_list.email | Email address | Loaded from orders for campaigns; deletion requests aren’t applied to it | Confidential | Apply each deletion to this copy as well as to the orders table |
| Orders database | shop.gift_cards.code | Card number (candidate) | Gift card codes that happen to pass the Luhn check | None | Rejected by the reviewer: store gift cards, not payment cards |
| Marketplace seller portal | The marketplace’s copy of orders | Not scanned | Held by the marketplace; no read access was granted | Unknown | Excluded: recorded as a gap, with the marketplace contract as its control |
PCI DSS v4.0.1 applies wherever card data is stored, so a card number in a delivery note brings the orders table into scope. Testing for 3.3.1.2 examines the data sources themselves, and the guidance lists logs and trace files among them.
In California, the CCPA as amended by the CPRA gives shoppers the right to delete. In the EU, GDPR Article 17 gives the right to erasure, and UK GDPR Article 17 does in the UK.
India’s DPDP Act adds a right to erasure in section 12(3), from May 2027, unless retention is needed. Our position for every market, subject to each law’s retention exceptions: a deletion counts as done only when each copy in the table above has had it applied, campaign lists included.
A deletion request names one shopper. Find each table that holds them, campaign copies and support exports included, before you confirm it.
Searches the confirmed personal-data locations in connected databases for the shopper. Your team makes each deletion in the source system.
Free-text fields, refund exports and support notes can pull card numbers out of the payment flow. Find them before an assessor finds them and they set your PCI DSS scope for you.
Reports values that match a card-number pattern and pass the Luhn check, and shows, from table and view grants, which roles can read the table they sit in.
Classifies sampled values in notes and comment columns as well as structured ones, so a card number typed into the wrong field is found where it sits.
Reads CSV, Excel and PDF exports in connected cloud storage and Microsoft 365, where refund and campaign files land.
Checks sampled values for masking, hashing or encryption, once the check is activated on your install, and flags customer data kept in plain form.
Logs access, correction and erasure requests, with the locations searched and those left out. The changes themselves happen outside IRIS, in the systems that hold the data.
Capabilities vary by edition.
IRIS finds card numbers already stored; it doesn’t stop a shopper typing one into a form, and it doesn’t delete anything. Your team makes those changes, and a re-scan records the new condition with its date.
It can’t see copies held by a marketplace, a payment processor or an email platform you haven’t connected. List those as gaps beside the scan, as in the last row above. Each scan is a dated, point-in-time reading of the stores you do connect.
What each law or standard asks of a retailer’s customer data.
IRIS scores GDPR, CCPA/CPRA and India’s DPDP Act. For PCI DSS, UK GDPR and UAE PDPL, IRIS maps its evidence to their controls. A scored view for these in ecommerce isn’t in v1; ask us if you need one.
Connect the orders database and the folder its exports land in, and scan both in one run. The how-it-works page follows that run, so you can see where each finding and each unread file is written.
Not always. It reads a sample of each large table, so a handful of card numbers in millions of notes can be missed in one run; scan again after a cleanup.
Yes. CCPA/CPRA is one of the six frameworks IRIS scores. PCI DSS isn’t, and its evidence supports your assessment instead.
No. Record the processor as a third-party service provider, and keep its attestation and the split of responsibilities that PCI DSS 12.8.4 and 12.8.5 ask for.
Name the orders database your support exports come from. We’ll show which customer data IRIS finds in it.