Guide. GDPR. Article 32.
GDPR Article 32: evidence for security of processing
Map each Article 32 measure to what an auditor tests, and check the stored form of your sensitive data against the systems that hold it.
Co-founder and CEO · Updated November 8, 2026

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Four kinds of evidence, one per measure
Article 32 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) asks controllers and processors for security appropriate to the risk. A policy that says data is protected is not evidence. Evidence is a dated record of how the data is stored, who can reach it and when someone last tested that.
The measures the article names each leave a different record, and the sections below take them in this order.
- Article 32(1)(a): a check of the stored form of each sensitive column, and of the connection to it
- Article 32(1)(b): who can reach each store, and when that access was last reviewed
- Article 32(1)(c): the last restore test of the systems that hold personal data
- Article 32(1)(d): dated test results with scope and method, re-run after each fix
Scope, roles and time needed
The SQL targets PostgreSQL 16, 17 and 18. Sylox ran them in its lab on versions 16, 17 and 18, on synthetic data. UK readers apply the same method under UK GDPR Article 32; the UK GDPR page covers the UK differences.
The database administrator (DBA) runs the queries and the data protection officer (DPO) or security lead reads the results against the risk assessment. One database takes about an hour. Collecting the same evidence from processors takes as long as they take to answer.
- A list of the columns your classification marked as sensitive
- A read-only role that can read those tables, and pg_read_all_stats for the connection query
- Your latest risk assessment for the processing, since Article 32 is judged against it
What Article 32 requires
Article 32(1) asks for technical and organizational measures that give a level of security appropriate to the risk. The level takes account of the state of the art, the costs, the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, and the risk. The list that follows is not exhaustive, and each measure applies as appropriate to the risk.
The four listed are (a) pseudonymization and encryption, which you check store by store, and (b) ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience. The others are (c) restoring availability and access in a timely manner after an incident, and (d) a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the measures.
Article 32(2) points the assessment at accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of and access to personal data. Recital 83 asks you to evaluate those risks and mitigate them. Check why a measure such as encryption fits the risk, because your risk assessment is part of the evidence.
Each measure, what the auditor tests, what you keep
The mapping is Sylox’s reading of the article. Your auditors judge whether a control is met.
| Article 32 measure | What the auditor tests | Evidence to keep | Where in this guide |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1)(a) Pseudonymization | Whether identifiers are separated from the additional information, and who holds it | Where the keys or lookup tables sit and who can reach them | Step 2 |
| (1)(a) Encryption checks | Whether sensitive columns, copies and connections are encrypted, and who holds the keys | Query 1 and query 2 output, key custody record | Steps 1 and 2 |
| (1)(b) Confidentiality | Who can reach each store, and the date of the last access review | Grant export, owner decisions, review date | Step 3 |
| (1)(b) Integrity and resilience | Controls that detect unauthorized change, and capacity to recover | Outside this guide: use your backup and monitoring records | Not covered |
| (1)(c) Restoring access | A restore test with a date, scope and result | The restore test report | Not covered |
| (1)(d) Regular testing | A repeatable test with dated results, re-run after fixes | The queries, their output and the re-run | Step 4 |
Step 1: check the stored form of sensitive columns
Start from the data, not the policy. For each system that holds personal data, check whether the stored values are in plain, masked, hashed or encrypted form, and whether the copies of that data are too. A setting on the database tells you about the storage layer. A check of the values tells you whether the sensitive columns themselves are protected, which matters most for exports and extracts.
Query 1 samples three columns and reports the share of each form by pattern. A pattern query can’t tell strong encryption from random-looking encoding, and a format-preserving token reads as plain, so it narrows the review and doesn’t replace it. Check the glossary entry on data masking for how masking, tokenization, hashing and encryption differ.
Query 2 counts the client connections that use TLS and those that don’t. Article 32(1)(a) names encryption without saying where, so a column that is encrypted at rest and read over a plain connection leaves a gap an auditor will find.
PostgreSQL 16 to 18: stored form and TLS
Read-only. Replace the three columns with yours; the connection query needs pg_read_all_stats to see other users’ sessions.
-- Query 1: stored form of sampled values (patterns, not proof)
WITH sample AS (
SELECT 'crm.customer.email' AS col, email::text AS v
FROM crm.customer TABLESAMPLE BERNOULLI (5) WHERE email IS NOT NULL
UNION ALL
SELECT 'billing.payment_card.card_number', card_number::text
FROM billing.payment_card TABLESAMPLE BERNOULLI (5) WHERE card_number IS NOT NULL
UNION ALL
SELECT 'hr.employee.national_id', national_id::text
FROM hr.employee TABLESAMPLE BERNOULLI (5) WHERE national_id IS NOT NULL
)
SELECT col, count(*) AS sampled,
count(*) FILTER (WHERE v ~ '[*xX#]{3,}') AS looks_masked,
count(*) FILTER (WHERE v ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' OR v ~ '^\$2[abxy]?\$') AS looks_hashed,
count(*) FILTER (WHERE v ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{32,}={0,2}$') AS looks_encoded,
count(*) FILTER (WHERE v !~ '[*xX#]{3,}' AND v !~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'
AND v !~ '^\$2[abxy]?\$' AND v !~ '^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{32,}={0,2}$') AS looks_plain
FROM sample GROUP BY col ORDER BY col;
-- Query 2: client connections with and without TLS
SELECT count(*) FILTER (WHERE s.ssl) AS tls_connections,
count(*) FILTER (WHERE NOT s.ssl) AS plain_connections
FROM pg_stat_ssl AS s
JOIN pg_stat_activity AS a ON a.pid = s.pid
WHERE a.backend_type = 'client backend';
SHOW ssl;What query 1 finds, value by value
Five values from the sampled columns. The last is a rejected false positive: a pattern that looks hashed and isn’t.
| Value | Detected type | Label | Reason | Kept or rejected |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| jane.example@example.com | Email address | Plain | Matches the address pattern; no masking or hashing | Kept |
| ************1111 | Payment card number | Flagged as masked | Asterisks replace all but the last four digits | Kept |
| a665a45920422f9d417e4867efdc4fb8a04a1f3fff1fa07e998e86f7f7a2e3a8 | Email address | Flagged as hashed | Sixty-four hex characters; unkeyed, so guessable for short inputs | Kept |
| 4111 1111 1111 1111 | Payment card number | Plain | Published test number; spaces between groups | Kept |
| 3f2a9c1e5b7d40a8b6c4e2f1a0d9c8b7a6e5d4c3b2a1f0e9d8c7b6a5f4e3d2c1 | Hex string flagged as hashed | Not personal data | Sixty-four hex characters, but the column holds build references; confirmed with the owner | Rejected |
Step 2: check pseudonymization and key custody
Article 4(5) defines pseudonymization as processing personal data so it can no longer be attributed to a specific person without additional information. That information must be kept separately, under measures that stop the attribution. Recital 26 says pseudonymized data that can be attributed to a person by using additional information is still personal data.
So the evidence is about the separation. Check where the lookup tables or keys sit, who can reach them, and whether any copy of the data still carries the direct identifiers. In the records above, the unkeyed hash of an email address fails that test, because anyone can recompute it for a guessed address.
Key management belongs in the evidence: who holds the keys, where they are stored and who can use them. Article 34(3)(a) shows the stakes. If encryption made breached data unintelligible to anyone not authorized to access it, you may not have to tell affected people about the breach.
Step 3: show who can reach the data
Unauthorized disclosure of and access to personal data are among the risks Article 32(2) asks you to weigh. An auditor asks who can reach each store of personal data, through which accounts, roles and groups, and when that access was last reviewed. Service accounts and broad groups need the same scrutiny as named users.
The method is in How to run a database access review, and the output of its queries is the evidence for this step. Article 32(4) adds that people acting under your authority process personal data only on your instructions, so keep the instruction and the training record with the access review.
Processors carry the duty too. Under Article 28(3)(c), a processor’s contract must require it to take all the measures Article 32 requires. Ask each processor for the same three records you keep yourself: stored form, access and tests.
Step 4: keep dated tests and re-test after fixes
Article 32(1)(d) asks for a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating whether the measures work. The evidence is the dated result, not the plan to test. Keep each test with its scope, method, date, result and what it did not cover.
After a fix, re-run the same queries on the same scope, so the record shows the condition before and after. Article 32(3) adds that an approved code of conduct or certification can help demonstrate that you meet Article 32(1). It supports the evidence and leaves the measures in place.
What these queries miss
Each gap can make a column look better or worse than it is. Note the ones that apply when you file the results.
| Gap | What to do about it |
|---|---|
| Checking encryption at rest below the database | PostgreSQL’s docs place this at file-system or block level; ask the platform team for the volume or provider setting |
| Format-preserving tokens | Query 1 reads a token that keeps the real value’s shape as plain; check with the team that built the tokenization |
| Small samples | Check the sample size: a sample can miss a plain column in a mostly masked table, so raise it for high-risk columns |
| Backups, exports and replicas | They hold their own copies; run the checks on each, or record why not |
| Checking application-level encryption | A ciphertext column looks encoded, and the query cannot tell strong from weak; review the design with the owner |
| Checking whether an encoding is encryption | Base64 is an encoding, so treat looks_encoded as a lead to verify and not a result |
The evidence folder for Article 32
File these together and lock the folder once signed.
| Evidence item | Produced by, when and where | Completeness check | Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| The risk assessment the measures answer | DPO, before the queries run | Dated, and names the processing it covers | GDPR Article 32(1) |
| Query 1 and 2 output, with the account that ran them | DBA, on the review date, on each store | Each sensitive column in the classification appears once | GDPR Article 32(1)(a) |
| Key custody record | Security lead, on the review date | Names who holds each key and where it is stored | GDPR Article 34(3)(a) |
| Access review output and decisions | DBA and data owners | A decision for every row; none by the grantee | GDPR Article 32(2) |
| Processor evidence | DPO, from each processor | One response per contract under Article 28 | GDPR Article 28(3)(c) |
| The re-run after each fix | DBA, after the change | The same queries and scope as the first run | GDPR Article 32(1)(d) |
IRIS checks the form of sampled values in each sensitive column, once the check is activated on your install. Your team closes the gaps in the source system. Capabilities vary by edition.
A check of the form of sampled values: encrypted, masked, hashed or plain: IRIS produces this.
A check of the encryption-at-rest setting of the database itself: IRIS produces part of this, on 9 database engines, beside the form found in sampled values.
Who can reach sensitive data, as of the scan date: IRIS produces part of this, where the source exposes permission data.
Judging cipher strength or key custody: Not produced by IRIS.
Applying protection in the source system: Not produced by IRIS.
A dated re-scan that records the new state beside the first: IRIS produces this.
Explore protection checksRun the queries again on the next review date
The check that closes this guide is the re-run in step 4. Check whether a column moved from plain to masked or encrypted after your change: the second output shows it, and the two files make the dated record. If it did not move, the change did not reach the data.
This guide does not cover backup and restore testing, data protection by design under Article 25 or breach notification under Articles 33 and 34. For UK GDPR work, IRIS maps its evidence to those controls through its unified compliance framework. A scored readiness view for that work isn’t in v1; ask us if you need one. This page is general information, not legal advice. The next guide in the sequence covers the records behind it: GDPR Article 30 records versus the real data estate.
Official sources
- GDPR Article 32, security of processing, EUR-Lex. Opened November 8, 2026.
- GDPR Article 4(5), definition of the term, EUR-Lex. Opened November 8, 2026.
- GDPR Article 28(3)(c) and Article 34(3)(a), EUR-Lex. Opened November 8, 2026.
- GDPR Recitals 26 and 83, EUR-Lex. Opened November 8, 2026.
- UK GDPR Article 32, legislation.gov.uk. Opened November 8, 2026.
- EDPB Guidelines 01/2025, consultation version, European Data Protection Board. Opened November 8, 2026.
- Accountability toolkit: records management and security, ICO (Information Commission). Opened November 8, 2026.
- PostgreSQL 18: pg_stat_ssl, PostgreSQL Global Development Group. Opened November 8, 2026.
Start with a free assessment of one database you choose.
Get a free assessmentArticle 32 questions
No. Article 32 names encryption as an example and does not make it mandatory. Record why the measure you chose fits the risk, and run query 1 to check the result.
Yes, where it can be attributed to a person with additional information. Recital 26 says so, and the separation of that information is the evidence to keep.
Yes, through the contract. Article 28(3)(c) requires processors to take the Article 32 measures, so ask for the same stored-form, access and testing records you keep yourself.
No. IRIS checks the form of sampled values and records the result with its scan date, and your auditors judge whether the control is met.
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